The advent of the EU-US Open Skies Agreement has been widely anticipated. A number of consequences have been predicted, for example, impacts on fares, on passenger volumes, choice and on consumer welfare. Airline costs are also predicted to fall as a result of increased competiveness and increased cooperation among airlines.
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For the full text of this licence, please go to: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ In the short period since the implementation of the Agreement, it is relatively easy to assess the principal supply-side changes that have been made, but more difficult to make wider judgements. For example, can traffic growth be attributed to Open Skies and does airline and alliance market power result in less fare flexibility with consequently less influence on changes in passenger volumes? Have airline costs changed and what has been the source of the savings? This paper offers some insight into the data that will be required to make these and other wider judgements and discusses some methodological difficulties.
Introduction
The EU-US Open Skies Agreement has been signed for over a year. The expectations of the likely results of such an agreement have been outlined in a variety of sources, some of them commissioned by government. It is too soon to reach any verdict. Consumer choice has broadened as indicated by the supply-side adjustments that have been made. However, the particular impact on fares, costs and passengers is of greater interest and there is a difficulty of data availability (fares and costs) as well as the appropriate choice of methodology to isolate changes due to Open Skies. Source: Button (2008) This replacement of the bilateral agreements between the US and EU member states, including those that had individual Open Skies Agreements, has two key features. 
The EU-US Open Sky Agreement

b. European Commission
The EU Transport Commissioner Jacques Barrot welcomed the deal and expressed optimism that EU ambitions for greater access to the US market would be fulfilled later thanks to the suspension clause. "The EU will have the right to suspend US access rights if they drag their feet . . So we will arrive at our final goal." 
e. Other airlines
Virgin Atlantic (VS), boss Sir Richard Branson, said, "It"s a good day for the traveller as consumers should eventually be able to fly from any city to any city between the EU and US, and within these countries," but VS also thought it was unlikely that prices could be any lower. British Midland International (BD) said the Agreement was a "landmark." "Millions of travellers will benefit from additional competition, including lower fares and a greater choice of services." 
f. Brattle Group
The Brattle Group (2002) 14 reported to the European Commission on the expected impacts of an OAA that included the removal of foreign ownership and cabotage restrictions as well as the removal of restrictions on route rights. This was in the same year that the European Court of Justice had confirmed that the individual bilaterals of Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, Germany and the UK infringed on the EU"s external competence and breached single market rules. It ordered that a single pact be negotiated and this led to the EU-US negotiations which resulted in the Open Skies Agreement.
Button (2008) summarises the report and the assumptions made, for example, on fare elasticities. In short, consumers benefit by about €5.2 billion a year from lower fares, brought about by greater competition and increased travel. Additional transatlantic passengers would amount to between 4.1 million and 11.0 million with many more on intra-EU routes resulting from network effects adding passengers to arrive at totals of 17.7 million to 46.7 million per year. Employment impacts are also estimated.
As all cabotage restrictions are lifted in an OAA as well as it giving other benefits on investment and factor mobility, these estimates provide an upper bound on the likely impacts from Open Skies 15 .
g. Booz Allen Hamilton
The European Commission asked Booz Allen Hamilton (2007) to update the Brattle Group"s work, so again this represents the impact of an OAA with full cabotage rights, although it is thought this would be more important for cargo operations. Consumers were calculated to benefit between €5.4 and €6.2 million per year and traffic was expected to grow to totals of 20.4 to 45.6 million per year from cost reductions, improved airline cooperation and the removal of output restrictions on the north Atlantic. Passengers resulting from the removal of output restrictions on the north Atlantic market alone total 26 million over five years with associated consumer surplus of €6.4 to €12 billion over the period. Again employment impacts were calculated and estimated at 72,000 with further jobs in the freight sector. These estimates are broadly similar to the Brattle Group even though the Booz Allen Hamilton report included the cost reductions due to increasing airline efficiency not only within the EU, as the Brattle Report did, but also within the US.
It is helpful for understanding to say more about the categories used to identify economic benefit and passenger numbers. The removal of output restrictions due to the existing bilateral air service agreements results in an increase in supply with a resulting downward pressure on prices and so stimulates 15 Although the income effects of the price falls are not accounted for.
demand and job creation. These effects are estimated for the UK, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Hungary, countries without Open Skies Agreements with the US, where in 2004 the UK accounted for 39.5 percent of total EU-US traffic with the remaining four countries at 4 percent. Economic growth is stimulated and consumer choice is broadened.
Increased competition reduces the relative market power of airlines and may facilitate closer alliances that allow coordination of prices and schedules to reduce costs and so fares. This improved airline cooperation is estimated to raise consumer surplus by €160 million to €340 million per year with price decreases varying between 18 and 28 percent and different price elasticity values of unity and 2.5 respectively. However, it is also possible that stronger alliances will weaken the beneficial price and choice impacts on consumers.
The final category is that of reductions in individual airlines" costs. The increased competition gives airlines the incentive to lower costs to remain competitive. This downward pressure on costs goes beyond the north Atlantic and impacts EU and US markets. Airlines are estimated to reduce operating costs by 1 to 3 percent and this could lead to lower fares and more demand again.
The main results of the Brattle Group and the Booz Allen Hamilton Report are summarised in Table 2 . Source: Morrell and Humphreys (2008) Given that LHR is slot-constrained, these changes may be more limited than if there was not such a constraint and the relative scarcity is indicated by the price at which slots are traded. Button (2008) 
Figure 3: LHR -US: US Airports Served by Airline and Daily Frequency, 2008
Source: Cole (2008) ii. Other Airports Figure 4 shows the proposed livery. BA management expected 70 percent of passengers to come from the US at ORY.
18 Port of Seattle (2007) (2008) iii.Virgin America
The most notable change that has resulted from the, in fact effectively hardly changed, ownership features of the Agreement is the foundation of Virgin America (VX) which began operating in August 2007 providing long haul point to point services between major metropolitan cities on the eastern and western seaboards. At present the airports served are LAX, San Diego (SAN), San Francisco (SFO), Las Vegas (LAS), JFK, Washington DC, Dulles (IAD) and SEA 23 . VS holds a 23 percent stake which is consistent with the ownership rules (Button, 2008) and the delay in its start up owes much to the doubts over whether VX was a US airline. Figure 5 shows Virgin America aircraft at JFK. The ASEAN Open Skies Agreement (Forsyth, King and Rodolfo, 2006 ) is between ten countries in south east Asia and there is pressure to expand the membership to include major Asian countries such as India, that already has a US Agreement, and China
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. It is not hard to imagine ASEAN collectively having Agreements with the EU and US. This in turn has prompted other Asian countries, such as Japan to consider similar initiatives. Indeed, Japan aims to have an agreement with ASEAN. It is also easy to contemplate initiatives that result in greater liberalisation and openness in South America and Africa. These could build on the existing US Agreements which include Uruguay, Paraguay and Peru in south America and Nigeria, Gambia, Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda, Mali, Cameroon, Chad and Liberia in Africa.
Research Needs: Data and Methods
It is evident from the economic analyses of the Brattle Group (2002) and Booz Allen Hamilton (2007) that data on passengers, fares and airline costs is required to assess the impact of the Open Skies Agreement along with data or assumptions on price elasticities. Each of these factors are discussed below.
a. Passengers
There is very good data on passenger numbers on the north Atlantic. The UK CAA (2008) has data by UK city and airport to US cities and airports online from 1997. The lowest level of temporal aggregation is by month from 1998. The US Bureau of Transportation Statistics (hereafter, US BTS, 2008a) has similar data online from 1990 which includes information on frequency of service, airline and aircraft type for which, in the UK case, data from the OAG (2008) must be sought. If this monthly data can be tied to fare changes, estimates of arc elasticity could be derived. Point elasticity would require an econometric estimation of a demand function using continuous data.
b. Fares
Airline web sites can provide data on fares that are offered and this has been the bases of some work analysing fare variation and correlation for low cost carriers in Pitfield (2005a Pitfield ( , 2005b . However, these same web sites, although they can show the variation in fares over time prior to departure, have the disadvantage that the link to passenger demand is only implicit. That is, the fares increase as the aircraft fills up. Consequently, estimates of price elasticity would be difficult to derive, not least, because there are a variety of fare types offered by legacy carriers and associating these fares with segments of demand would face added data difficulties. Airlines might only be aware of the yield per flight and, after all, this is what they are managing.
The US BTS (2008b) provides a quarterly 10 percent sample of tickets that shows what passengers actually paid but this is only available for the US domestic market. A government initiative would be required to extend this sample to the north Atlantic. Without such an initiative, recourse would be to airline data, given cooperation and the fact that the data is recorded and stored, or a survey of passengers, which might require industry support. Appropriate fare data is difficult to obtain although an indication may be gained by using passenger numbers and estimates of revenue from US BTS data, that is, a yield. This average for each airline can be derived for each year or quarter and is the basis of some elasticity estimates.
c. Airline Costs
Changes in costs are taken to arise from increased competition between airlines as well as from closer alliances and cooperation. Airline financial data is available in company accounts and this may give sufficient detailed insight into operating costs. Case studies and cross sectional studies might be able to yield further insights and econometric estimation might fill gaps in knowledge. As such disaggregate data is commercially sensitive so good information may be hard to achieve. The US Bureau of Transportation Statistics (US BTS, 2008c) provides annual and quarterly profit and loss statement data, including operating costs with a reasonable degree of disaggregation, but only for large US carriers with operating revenues above $20 million per annum. Categories identified are maintenance, flying operations, promotion and sales and passenger service. The UK CAA (2006) provides annual profit and loss account details for individual airlines where total operating costs can be disaggregated into some 27 items including maintenance, flight crew and cabin crew salaries, passenger services and station costs, where the latter might benefit from airline cooperation. There is a difference in the periodicity of these cost data as well as a potential difference with fare and passenger data.
d. Elasticities
Elasticities can be assumed as they were in the Brattle Group (2008) and Booz Allen and Hamilton (2007) studies or calculated. Simple arc elasticity calculations require percentage changes in fares and the associated changes in passengers whilst point elasticity calculations require continuous data and an appropriate econometric estimation of a demand function. The issue here, as indicated above, is not the methods, but the data.
e. Consumer Surplus
To replicate the consumer surplus results as reported in the Brattle Group(2002) and Booz Allen and Hamilton (2007) studies 26 requires estimates of changes in passengers attributable to the Agreement. To convert these to surpluses simply requires assumptions on elasticities and data on fares. These assumptions could be repeated as well as the calculation relating passengers to operating revenues to derive fare estimates, albeit only for quarters at best.
Dealing with the Counterfactual
The counterfactual was a key feature of work in econometric history in the 1960"s. Fogel (1964) and Fishlow(1965) Pitfield (2007) has produced some work on airline alliances which is pertinent to this topic, in particular, because the growth of alliances might well temper the impact on fare reductions from competition and so traffic growth, although alliances may also result in fare reductions from airline cooperation as costs fall. The question that this paper specifically dealt with was, whether it is possible to identify the change in alliance market share and passengers on a route as a result of code sharing and the signing of the individual European Open Skies Agreements with the US. Iatrou and Alamdari (2005) had suggested from survey work that airline expectations were positive, yet Pitfield (2007) found no specific impact on passenger numbers or alliance shares, using time series analysis and intervention analysis, beyond the changes that resulted from changes in fares, aircraft types and frequencies that the airlines had made on these routes continually since 1990. That is, this estimate of the counterfactual suggested that the alliances had no further impact.
This time series analysis might be a way of dealing with recorded changes in passenger data to isolate that due to the Agreement as this data exists. The sparsity of other data might be as big a handicap in the case of fares and costs, although if this desideratum is met the issue of causality still remains.
Conclusion
This paper has detailed the main features of the EU-US Open Skies Agreement and has summarised both the political reactions to the Agreement as well as the reasoned economic analysis of the expected outcomes. The effects that can be identified to date consisted of changes in airline service offerings, particularly at LHR, and demonstration effects. The paper concluded with an analysis of the data and methodological requirements of an assessment of the impact of the Agreement.
It can be concluded that to assess the impact requires overcoming difficulties in data collection on fares and costs, whilst on passengers, it needs to be determined what proportion of change is attributable to the Agreement. This raises methodological issues.
